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THIRD CIRCUIT ADOPTS UNIFORM LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR

1934
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lOb-5-In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d
1537 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).

ACTIONS ARISING FROM SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
SECTION

Although not found in the statute itself, federal courts have
long recognized a private cause of action arising from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section 10(b) (section 10(b))' and the
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5 (Rule lOb-5). 2
Because Congress did not create a private cause of action when
the Act was adopted, no specific limitations period exists for alleged violations. 3 Consequently, federal courts have frequently
utilized the "absorption doctrine" to judicially fashion periods of
repose.4 Under this method, statutes of limitations, borrowed
from the "most clearly analogous" forum state law, have been
I Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) deals with manipulative and deceptive practices within national securities exchange and provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988) [hereinafter Rule lOb-5]. The Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5 declares:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange;
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id. See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) ("It is now established that a private right of action is implied under
§ 10(b).").
3 See Comment, Statutes of Limitations in lOb-5 Actions: A ProposalFor Congressional
Legislation, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1154, 1154-55 (1973).
4 See Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 Bus.
LAw. 645, 646 (1986) [hereinafter Task Force Report].

724

725

NOTE

applied to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions.5
This practice has been criticized by both judges6 and commentators 7 as being confusing and arbitrary, and has lead to a
lack of certainty and uniformity in the litigation of such cases.8
Thus, the lack of an express limitations period has caused a great
deal of confusion in the litigation of securities actions. In an effort to alleviate this confusion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re Data Access Systems Securities

Litigation,' adopted a single, well defined limitations period, borrowed from analogous federal securities provisions,' ° for use in
all such claims.'"
Shareholders of Data Access Systems, Inc. (Data Access),' 2
brought a class action" in securities fraud alleging violations of
5 See Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980);
Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979).
6 See, e.g., Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.
329 (1987) (stating Congress or Supreme Court must effectuate uniformity and
predictability in this area); McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598
F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting the use of federal limitations period would be
desirable to promote national uniformity).
7 See, e.g., L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1164-75 (1983)
(suggesting federal provisions may contain more closely analogous limitations
periods).
8 See Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 646. The report noted that, among the
federal circuits and state courts, no unified approach exists in deciding which state
limitations period to borrow. Id. Moreover, three federal circuits have applied
state blue sky laws. See, e.g., Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000 (7th
Cir. 1984); Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 690 (8th
Cir. 1981); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976). Three have
applied state fraud provisions. See, e.g.,
Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 739 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1983); Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870 (1 0th Cir. 1982). The First Circuit has
applied a limitations period borrowed from state personal injury law. See Cook v.
Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1978), and the remaining four circuits are undecided as to any definite approach. Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 659-61. State
courts have applied similarly diverse approaches: 19 use state blue sky laws (includes Washington, D.C.); 18 use fraud provisions; I uses personal injury; and 13
have no controlling authority. Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 662-66.
9 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 131 (1988).
10 Id. at 1545-50. The Data Access court borrowed the limitations period from
companion sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
I

Id. at 1550.

12 Data Access Systems, Inc. is a corporation based in Blackwood, New Jersey.
In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 103 F.R.D. 130, 135 (D.N.J. 1984),
rev'd, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988). The company sells, leases and services
microcomputers and computer terminal equipment. Id.
13 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1538. The United States District Court for the
District of NewJersey granted the shareholders' motion for class action certification
on September 20th, 1984 concluding "[p]ublic policy demands that aggrieved parties be afforded an opportunity to test the merits of their case .

. .

. 'The effective-
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section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5.' 4 The shareholders, purchasers of
common stock, filed the complaint amidst public disclosures of
15
fraudulent business and stock trading involving Data Access.
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) also filed a complaint against Data Access, alleging the company violated federal
securities laws. 6 Data Access then sought bankruptcy protection. 17
Although not named as defendants in two prior amended
complaints, a third amended complaint filed by the shareholders
named a company lawyer and his law firm as having knowledge of
both misrepresentations made in a public offering prospectus
18
and material inaccuracies on Data Access' Form 10-K filings.
The amended complaint also charged that an accountant and his
accounting firm "fraudulently and recklessly misrepresented and
failed to disclose," to Data Access' auditors certain facts pertaining to the company's obligations toward one of its affiliates. 9
ness of the securities laws may depend in large measure on the application of the
class action device.' " In re Data Access, 103 F.R.D. at 149 (quoting Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1970)).
14 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1537.
15 Id. at 1538. On February 24th, 1981, a federal grand jury indicted Gerald R.
Cicconi, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Data Access Systems, Inc. "on charges of interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained
checks." In re Data Access,' 103 F.2d at 135. Touche Ross & Co., Data Access' auditor for its 1978-1980 financial statements, announced on June 19, 1981, that these
statements appeared to be "materially misstated" and should be deemed withdrawn. Id.
16 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1538. A Consent Order entered on this complaint provided for "the appointment of a Special Agent to investigate the matters
set forth in the complaint. On March 15th, 1982, the Special Agent submitted his
report and recommendations detailing the [Data Access] fraud." In re Data Access,
103 F.R.D. at 135.
17 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1538. Data Access filed a voluntary petition on
January 21 st, 1983, for reorganization under federal Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11.
In re Data Access, 103 F.R.D. at 135. The district court confirmed Data Access' Plan
of Reorganization on August 29th, 1984. Id.
18 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1538. The two defendants, a New York attorney,
and his law firm, allegedly "ignored or disregarded clear evidence that such representations [in the 1979 public offering prospectus and Form 10Ks] were false, and
participated in, aided and abetted, and conspired with principals of Data Access
and others to defraud the shareholder[s]." Id. at 1538.
19 Id. at 1539. The complaint contended that the accountant and his firm made
material misrepresentations to Touche Ross & Co. regarding the company's liabilities for one of its affiliates, Mark Serv Co. Id. Mark Serv was "a partnership owned
by, inter alia, certain officers, shareholders, and associated persons of Data Access."
Id. at 1538. Data Access undertook the obligations as surety for several Mark Serv
bank loans. Id. at 1539. The defendants allegedly knew of Data Access' obligations
but represented to Touche Ross & Co. "that there were no liabilities and guarantees on the part of [Data Access] to the Mark Serv lending banks, and that said
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The shareholders claimed that all four defendants "aided and
abetted, and conspired with the principals of Data Access and
others to defraud the shareholder-plaintiffs" in violation of fed20
eral securities law.
Applying the "absorption doctrine," the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey found that the applicable statute of limitations for the shareholders' section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 claims should be borrowed from New Jersey's sixyear period which governs common law fraud actions. 2 ' Data Access appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, contending that the
proper statute of limitations should be the two-year period contained in NewJersey's Blue Sky law. 22 The district court certified
two questions for review by the court of appeals.2 3 First, the district court queried whether the shareholders must assert in their
third amended complaint, a viable cause of action under the New
Jersey Blue Sky law in order for the two-year period to be applicable.2 4 Second, if so required, did the shareholders' amended
complaint, alleging that the four defendants "substantially participated and/or aided and abetted in the sale of securities," pres25
ent a viable cause of action under this statutory provision.
Sitting in banc," 6 the Third Circuit rejected reliance on
analogous state law. Instead, the court held that the proper statute of limitations should be borrowed not from a similar state
banks were not relying upon [Data Access] or upon any obligation undertaken by
[Data Access] as security for their loans to Mark Serv." Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1538. New Jersey provides for a six-year limitations period for actions
involving fraud. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (West 1987).
22 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1538. NewJersey's Blue Sky law states that anyone who "offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading
(the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission), is liable to the person buying
the security from him." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-71(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988). The
statute further provides that "[n]o person may sue under this section more than
two years after the contract of sale, or within two years of the time when the person
aggrieved knew or should have known of the existence of his cause of action, whichever is later." Id. § 49:3-71(e).
23 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1539. The district court certified these two questions for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In re Data
Access, 843 F.2d at 1539.
24 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1539.
25 Id. The New Jersey Blue Sky law only states a cause of action for those "offer[ing]" or "sell[ing]" stock. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-71(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
26 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1550-51.

728

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:724

statute but from the most clearly analogous federal statutory period. 2 7 Citing sections 77m, 78i(e), 78r(c), and 78cc(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Third Circuit concluded that
the proper period of limitations should be one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and no longer than
three years after the alleged violation transpired.2 8
Prior to Data Access, the use of the "absorption doctrine" was
well-accepted as evidenced by the United States Supreme Court's
pronouncement in McCluny v. Silliman.29 In McCluny, the plaintiff
claimed a United States land register in Ohio refused to properly
record a land transaction in accordance with a federal statutory
scheme.3 0 Since the federal statute contained no limitations period, the defendant asserted a state limitations period should apply to the federal cause of action. 3 ' Specifically, the defendant
cited the running of an Ohio six-year statute of limitations for
actions arising out of federal law.3 2 The Court, applying the "absorption doctrine," held that the state law limitations period applied, rendering the plaintiff's suit time-barred. 3 In arriving at
its decision, the McCluny Court opined that when Congress was
silent as to the statute of limitations of a federal law, state limitation periods would be applicable in the federal courts.3 4
See id. at 1550.
Id. These sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provide for an express limitations period of one year after the cause of action was discovered and no
longer than three years after the alleged actions transpired. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77m,
78i(e), 78r(c), and 78cc(b) (1982).
29 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
30 Id. at 276.
31 See id.
32 Id. The Ohio law provided, in pertinent part, that "all actions upon the case,
and of debt for rent, shall be sued or brought within six years next after the cause
of such actions or suits." Id. at 277.
27
28

33 Id. at 278.
34 Id. at 277. Justice McLean, writing for the Court, stated that "[i]t is a well

settled principle, that a statute of limitations is the law of the forum, and operates
upon all who submit themselves to its jurisdiction." Id. In support of this declaration, Justice McLean quoted § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provides in
pertinent part, "[t]hat the laws of the several states, except where the constitution,
treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply." Id. (quoting Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat.
73-93 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)). The modern provision
of this section, known as the Rules of Decision Act, reads: "The laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
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It had rarely been disputed by the Supreme Court that, absent a congressional alternative, state statutes of limitations
would be applied in federal courts.35 In 1895, however, the
Supreme Court in Campbell v. Haverhill36 discussed this issue at
length. The Court in Campbell considered the application of a
Massachusetts tort statute of limitations to a federal patent infringement law.37 In assessing such an application, the Court
grappled with the interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act.38
The court recognized the argument that individual states, "having no power to create the right or enforce the remedy, have no
power to limit such remedy or to legislate in any manner with
respect to . . .causes of action enforceable only in the Federal
'' 9
courts. 1

The Campbell Court, however, insisted this interpretation
would only apply if the state statute of limitations used did not
run adverse to the congressional intent of the federal cause of
action. 4' The Court maintained that Congress did not intend for
the Rules of Decision Act to allow states to manifest hostility toward federal laws, but instead intended state statute of limitations to be administered where no discrimination or conflict
arises. 4
Moreover, the Campbell Court declared that the right to a
federal cause of action is not weakened by using the state period
but rather, only the remedy is affected. 42 The Court further determined that Congress surely did not intend an unlimited period in which to file suit for those entitled to bring patent
infringement actions.4 3 In holding the state tort law limitations
35 Hill, State ProceduralLaw in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 66,
78 (1955). See, e.g., Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 130 U.S. 693 (1889); Amy v.
Dubuque, 98 U.S. 470 (1878); Leffingwell v. Warren, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 599 (1862);
Shelby v. Guy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat) 361 (1826). See also Bauserman v. Blunt, 147
U.S. 647, 652 (1893) (recognizing that no body of state law had been more uniformly followed than statutes of limitation).
36 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
37 Id. at 614. No applicable federal statute of limitations existed for actions involving the infringement of patents when the plaintiff's cause of action accrued. Id.
38 See id. The particular portion of the Act provides that state law is enforceable
only "in cases where they apply." Id. (citation omitted).
39 Id. at 615.
40 See id. at 614-15.
41 See id.at 615.
42 See id. at 618.
43 Id. at 616. The Court questioned whether "it [is] not more reasonable to
presume that Congress, in authorizing an action for infringement intended to subject such action to the general laws of the State applicable to actions of a similar
nature?" Id. The Court went on to observe that statutes of limitations are insti-
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period applicable, 44 the Court opined that comparable state and
federal actions should be enforced similarly within the same
jurisdiction.4 5
Fifty years later in Holmberg v. Armbrecht,4 6 the Court maintained that "the silence of Congress has been interpreted to
mean that it is federal policy to adopt the local law of limitation. "' 7 The Holmberg Court, however, held that state statutes of
limitations should not control in federal suits for equitable relief,
because borrowing state periods was not mandatory.4 8 Federal
courts have the duty, the Court declared, to apply uniform national principles in the enforcement of congressionally created
laws. 4 9 More significantly, the Court posited that "[a] federal
court may not be bound by a State statute of limitation." 5 Thus,
according to the Holmberg Court, when a state limitation statute is
applied, it is done simply as a method of fashioning remedial
5
details. '
The Holmberg Court further explained that the exception to
applying state periods of repose in federal suits for equity was
due to the very nature of the claim.52 The Court stressed that in
most suits brought under a federal cause of action, fairness requires the implementation of a statute of limitations.5 3 The
Court noted, however, that the concept of equitable relief relies
tuted to secure prompt enforcement of claims by stating that "it can scarcely be
supposed that an individual would remain forever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture."
Id. at 616-17 (citing Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805)).
44 Id. at 614-17.
45 Id. at 616. What would be created absent this interpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act, according to the Campbell Court, is a "class of privileged plaintiffs"
devoid of a limitations period within which to bring their claims. Id.
46 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
47 Id. at 395 (citing Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895)).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 396.
51 Id. at 395. While the Court cites to Campbell as the proper method in determining limitations periods in non-equity suits, the Holmberg holding casts a doubt as
to how far the Court is willing to apply the past Rules of Decision Act rationale. See
id. The Court does not mention the Rules of Decision Act as the authority for
borrowing state statutes of limitation, but instead finds that congressional silence
"has been interpreted to mean that it is [simply] federal policy to adopt the local
law of limitation." Id.
52 See id. at 397. The Court pointed out that in a suit based on fraud, limitations
periods are not strictly followed when the fraud was undetectable to the plaintiff.
Id. The Court further declared that "[e]quity eschews mechanical rules; it depends
on flexibility." Id. at 396.
53 See id.
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on the distinct defense of laches. 54 Thus, the Court declared that
in equity, it is neither fair nor necessary to apply any strict state
statute of limitations.5 5
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Anderson v. Andrews,5"
relied upon the Holmberg Court's analysis in reversing a district
court decision.5 7 In Anderson, the receiver of a defunct Kentucky
based national bank brought a diversity suit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging
violations under the National Bank Act and the Federal Reserve
Act.5 8 The receiver sought to recover, through personal liability
suits against certain shareholders residing in Pennsylvania, the
balance of a previous judgment award. 5 9 Reasoning that a Pennsylvania "borrowing" statute required the application of Kentucky law, the district court held the action time-barred due to
the running of the appropriate Kentucky statute of limitations.60
Noting the absence of a federal period of repose, the district
court relied on the Rules of Decision Act to find Kentucky's limitations period applicable. 6
The court maintained that
"[a]lthough this right of action is based on a federal statute, it
62
may be enforced only in conformity to the law of the forum.
According to the court, Kentucky's limitation period was applicable because of a Pennsylvania "borrowing" statute which provided: "When a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws
54 Id. The Court posited that "laches is not like limitation, a mere matter of
time; but principally a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced - an inequity founded upon some change in the condition or relations of
the property or the parties." Id. (quoting Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 373
(1892)).
55
56

Id.

156 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1946), rev'd sub nom. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461
(1947).
57 Anderson, 156 F.2d at 975 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392
(1946)).
58 Anderson v. Andrews, 62 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rev'd, 156 F.2d 972
(3d Cir. 1946), revd sub nor. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947).
59 Anderson, 62 F. Supp. at 707. The receiver had been awarded a judgment of
$4,000,000 against BancoKentuckv, a holding company that had owned nearly all
of the bank's stock. Id. at 706-07. The company paid $90,000 toward the judgment
and the receiver instituted a separate action against individual shareholders of BancoKentucky, who were Kentucky residents, to extract the remaining balance. Id. at
707. The receiver eventually won the suit after review by the United States
Supreme Court. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1943), reh'g denied, 321 U.S.
804 (1944). The receiver also brought suit against those shareholders of BancoKentucky residing in Pennsylvania. Anderson, 62 F.Supp. at 707.
60 Anderson, 62 F. Supp. at 708-09.
(1 Id. at 707-08.
62 Id. at 708.
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of the state or country in which it arose, such bar shall be a comthereon brought in any of the courts of
plete defense to an action
63
this Commonwealth."
In reversing the district court's decision, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, relying heavily on Holmberg, found Pennsylvania's "borrowing" statute inapplicable.6 4 The Third Circuit
determined that the cause of action arose from a federal statute
and therefore, state rules of law could not limit the claim. 65 According to the court, this case presented "one of those instances
where federal courts are enforcing rights arising out of transactions governed by the federal government acting within its constitutional field. ' 6 6 While the appellate court was cognizant of
the fact that it was departing from the holding of a recent Sixth
Circuit decision,6 7 it concluded that the Supreme Court's holding
in Holmberg justified this departure.6 8 The69 Supreme Court, however, reversed the Third Circuit's ruling.
The Supreme Court declared that since the federal statute
made no express provisions, Pennsylvania law must be applied to
determine the proper limitation period.7" Accordingly, the
Court held that the district court was correct in applying Penn63 Anderson, 156 F.2d at 973 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 39 (Purdon 1895)).
In this case the suit was brought outside Kentucky's five-year provision, but within
Pennsylvania's six-year period. Id. Defendants contended, and the court agreed,
that since the cause of action arose in Kentucky, the Pennsylvania "borrowing" statute barred recovery. Anderson, 62 F. Supp. at 708-09.
64 Anderson, 156 F.2d at 975.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, just two months
earlier, in a case dealing with identical circumstances, found that an Ohio "borrowing" statute, similar to that of Pennsylvania, was applicable. See Helmers v. Anderson, 156 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1946). The Kentucky statute of limitations was
considered controlling and the action time-barred. Id. at 52. The Sixth Circuit
cited to the opinion of the district court in Anderson, stating that:
The same question was presented to the District Court of Pennsylvania

in Anderson . . . where this same receiver brought suit against stock-

holders residing in Pennsylvania. It was there held under a similar
Pennsylvania Borrowing Statute that the Statute of Limitations of Kentucky was applicable to and barred the cause of action set out in the
complaint.
Helmers, 156 F.2d at 52 (citing Anderson v. Andrews, 62 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Pa.
1945), rev'd, 156 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461
(1947)). The Sixth Circuit decision in Helmers was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court as a companion case to Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 468
(1946).
6 Anderson, 156 F.2d at 975.
(i)Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947).
70 Id. at 463.
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sylvania's "borrowing" statute to bar the action under Kentucky's
five-year limitation period. 7 ' Furthermore, the Court maintained
that the error in the court of appeals' reliance on Holmberg
stemmed from its misconception that the suit was brought under
equitable principles. 72 The Court pointed out that in Anderson
only the relief sought gave rise to equitable considerations.7 3 As
precedent dictates, enunciated the Court, the federal cause of action was nevertheless bound by the analogous state provisions. 4
It was against this backdrop that the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals first addressed the issue of which statute of limitations
should be applied in private section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions
in Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co. 7 5 In Roberts, a stockholder
brought suit against a corporation for alleged violations of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 76 Because neither section 10(b) nor
Rule lOb-5 contain a statute of limitations, 7 7 the court determined that the "absorption doctrine" must be used to impute an
analogous state period.78
In order to apply the proper period of repose, the Roberts
71 Id. at 464, 468.
72

See id. at 464-65.

73 Id.
74 See id. at 464 (citing Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 289 (1940)).
75 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979). The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, in December 1946, first determined that a private cause of
action may be implied under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum, 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). In Kardon, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants fraudulently conspired to induce them to sell certain stock for considerably less than its true market value. Id. at 513. The district
court, in dismissing a motion that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action, found
an implied civil action in § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Id. at 514-15. Noting that other
sections of the statute expressly allow for a private cause of action and its overall
purpose is the general regulation of all kinds of securities transactions, the district
court concluded that "the mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is
not sufficient to negative what the general law implies." Id. at 514. Twenty five
years later the United States Supreme Court confirmed the view of the lower courts
and held a private civil action arises by implication from § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971). Because Congress had not originally anticipated a civil action, no statute of
limitations was imposed in either provision. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976).
76 Id. at 452. James Roberts, a stockholder of Magnetic Metals Co., charged that
the defendant, Langworthy, a 84% shareholder in the company, provided false and
misleading proxy statements when soliciting shareholder votes for a merger agreement. Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 463 F. Supp. 934, 936 (D.N.J. 1978), revd,
611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979). The United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey dismissed the complaint under the New Jersey Blue Sky law's two-year
statute of limitations. Roberts, 611 F.2d at 452.
77 Id. See supra note 3.
78 Roberts, 611 F.2d at 454.
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court was compelled to "look not for an analogous federal limitations period, but for an analogous forum state limitations period."' 79 The court, however, stated that "[m]uch can be said,
perhaps, for a different rule.., directing a federal court to statutes of limitations governing analogous federal causes of action." 8 Although this statement echoed the Third Circuit's prior
rationale, 8 ' the court went on to concede that "the rule has been
otherwise for many years, and an inferior federal court is not free
'
to change it. "82
In reversing the district court ruling, the appellate court in
Roberts found the most analogous state provision to be contained
in New Jersey's six-year limitations period governing common
law fraud. 8 ' The court pointed out that the district court's application of the New Jersey Blue Sky law's 84 two-year limitations period was clearly misguided.8" The court noted the Blue Sky law
protects only those buying securities, not against the abuse of a
fiduciary duty.8 6 The court of appeals further reasoned that
there is no state law protection for the plaintiff against alleged
frauds perpetrated by those soliciting tender offers for a merger
agreement. 8 7 Thus, the court observed that since the plaintiff's
allegations were actionable under both the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the New Jersey common law fraud provision,
application of the six-year limitations period was appropriate.8 8
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Seitz emphasized that
the New Jersey Blue Sky law was enacted with the goal of "regulat[ing] . . . misinformation in the sale of securities." 89 Because
this statutory scheme was devised to combat similar problems,
ChiefJudge Seitz maintained that the New Jersey Blue Sky law is
naturally more analogous to the federal securities statute than a
catch-all fraud provision. 0 Although Chief Judge Seitz consid79 Id. (citingJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); United
Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Cope v. Anderson,
331 U.S. 461 (1947)).
80 Id.
81 See Anderson v. Andrews, 156 F.2d 972, 975 (3d Cir. 1946), rev'd sub nom.
Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947).
82 Roberts, 611 F.2d at 454.
83 Id. at 453.
84 See supra note 22.
85 Roberts, 611 F.2d at 453.

86 Id.

Id.
See id. at 454.
89 Id. at 462 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
90 Id. According to Chief Judge Seitz, New Jersey's Blue Sky law was modeled
87
88
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ered the Blue Sky law preferable to a common law fraud period
of limitations, he opined that were it not for Supreme Court precedent, he would have applied a more analogous federal statute
as a limitation period for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions. 9 '
In Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. ,92 the Third Circuit reaffirmed the analysis set out in the Roberts decision.9" In
Biggans, an investor charged his broker with, inter alia, violations
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.9 4 The broker allegedly made
purchases and sales through the investor's discretionary trading
account for the sole purpose of creating brokerage commissions. 9 5 In reversing the district court's decision to invoke the
limitation period under the state's securities act,9 6 the Biggans
court found the most analogous period was contained in Pennsylvania's six-year provision governing common law fraud. 97 As
with Roberts, the court determined that under the Pennsylvania
securities scheme, only buyers and sellers were subject to civil
liability.98 Moreover, the court of appeals emphasized that since
the investor neither bought nor sold from his broker, he had no
cause of action under state securities law. 9 9
specifically after federal securities enactments. Id. He additionally posited that the
two-year limitation period was a carefully thought out, integral aspect of the securities regulations scheme derived from the federal acts. Id. ChiefJudge Seitz's opinion was not affected by the fact that only sellers were liable under the Blue Sky law.

Id. He reasoned that "[t]o give decisive weight to the presence or absence of particular elements of a cause of action misperceives the function of analogy in this
context." Id.
91 Id. at 463 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Judge noted that several commentators have suggested federal statutes may contain more closely analogous provisions. Id. (citing 6 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 3898-900 (1969)). The
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the proper statute of limitations period for
§ 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 actions. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210
n.29 (1976). The Court has, however, held that state law should be used to make
the proper determination. See Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S 461 (1947).
92 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 606-07.
95 Id. at 606.
96 Id. at 607. The Pennsylvania Securities Act provides in pertinent part:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability.. .unless brought
before the expiration of three years after the act or transaction constituting the violation or the expiration of one year after the plaintiff receives
actual notice or upon the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
known of the facts constituting the violation, whichever shall first expire.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-504(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
97 Biggans, 638 F.2d at 610.
98 Id. at 609.

99 Id. at 610. Circuit Judge Weis filed a dissenting opinion noting his agreement
with Chief Judge Seitz's dissent in Roberts. Id. at 611 (Weis,J., dissenting). Accord-
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While the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reluctantly applied
the rationale of the Supreme Court decisions to section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 actions, the nation's highest court appeared to be
retreating from the mandatory use of the "absorption doctrine."' 0 0 For example, in DelCostello v. InternationalBrotherhood of
Teamsters,'' the Court held that when a similar federal rule
"clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes,
and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of
litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle
for interstitial lawmaking," federal courts should apply the federal scheme. 0 2 The Court, however, stressed that its decision in
DelCostello should not be viewed as a departure from past
practice. 0 3
In DelCostello, a truck driver filed a grievance against his employer after being discharged for refusing to drive a tractortrailer he believed to be unsafe.'0 4 A joint company-union committee concluded that his grievance was without merit. 0 5 Nearly
six months later the driver filed suit in a Maryland district court
claiming that he had been represented at the grievance procedure in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.' 0 6 The district
court dismissed the action, ruling that it was brought outside
Maryland's thirty-day limitations period for actions to vacate arbitration decisions.'0 7 On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the
ing to Judge Weis, "[tihe limitation period for a federal remedy is best found by
looking to an analogous state remedy, not an exact duplicate." Id. This approach,
advanced Judge Weis, is more in line the majority of the circuit courts. Id. (citing
O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 18 (4th Cir. 1980); Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co.,
600 F.2d 139, 145 (8th Cir. 1979)).
100 See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
101 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
102 See id. at 172.
103 Id. Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, viewed the majority's decision as
a direct departure from prior law. Id. at 174-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Maintaining that prior Court holdings were predicated on borrowing the most clearly analogous state limitation period as set forth by the Rules of Decision Act, Justice
Stevens emphasized that "no class of state legislation has... been more steadfastly
and consistently applied than [state statutes of limitations]." Id. at 174 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614 (1895)). It
is one thing to imply a civil cause of action, asserted Justice Stevens, but quite another to abandon prior procedure and use a period that Congress had chosen for a
different purpose. Id. at 174 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 156.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 156.
107 Id. See MD. CTs. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-224 (1980).

19891

NOTE

737

district court's findings. 0 8 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower courts' holdings and determined that the proper
statute of limitations rested not in analogous state law but in section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act.' 0 9
The DelCostello Court posited that while it has been practice
to use analogous state statutes of limitations, in some circumstances state provisions can be "unsatisfactory vehicles for the
enforcement of federal law."" 0 The DelCostello Court further observed that state limitations periods have been deemed unacceptable for certain federal actions arising solely in equity.''' In
support of its position, the Court cited Holmberg v. Armbrecht,' l2
where the Court held that state statutes of limitations were inappropriate in federal equity actions." 3 When the use of state remedial provisions frustrate federal substantive law, declared the
Court, related federal statutes must be applied to preserve congressional intent." 4
While the Supreme Court insisted the decision in DelCostello
was not a precedential departure,'.' two years later in Wilson v.
Garcia116 the Court again weakened the standard of applying forum state limitations periods.' ' 7 The plaintiff in Wilson brought
suit against a New Mexico police officer for violations of the federal Reconstruction Civil Rights Act."' The claim included
108 DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 679 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1982),

rev'd, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).

109 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 170. The National Labor Relations Act reads in pertinent part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in
any such unfair labor practice . . . the [National Labor Relations] Board
...shall have power to issue... upon such person a complaint stating
the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before
the Board . . . [p]rovided, [t]hat no complaint shall [be] issue[d] based
upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to
the filing of the charge.
29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
1 1o DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162.
'''
Id. at 162.
112 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
' 3 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395

(1946)).
114 Id. at 161.
115 Id. at 172.
116 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
Id.
118 Id. at 262-63. The suit, brought under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
alleged that the police officer brutally beat the defendant after an unlawful arrest.
Id. at 263 (citing Civil Rights Act, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
117
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causes of action for false arrest and assault and battery." 9
Although each of the causes of action arose under the federal Act, the Wilson Court acknowledged that each may have
uniquely analogous counterparts in state law. 120 The Court recognized that using the "absorption doctrine," would force a deci12
sion between different applicable state limitations periods. '
Because claims under the Act may encompass many legal theories, the Court declared that a single remedial determination
must be made. 12 2 The Wilson Court concluded that a "simple,
broad characterization of all [section] 1983 claims best fits the
[federal] statute's remedial purpose."'' 23 The court devised a
three-step analysis for selecting1 24which limitations period would
govern the section 1983 claim.
First, the Court noted that the Reconstruction Civil Rights
Act states that a determination must be made as to whether federal or state law best characterizes the claim. 1 25 The Court found
that when characterizing claims under the federal Act, congressional intent indicates that such actions shall be exercised and
enforced in "conformity with the laws of the United States" 126
unless federal law offers no adequate remedy. 1 27 If an adequate
remedy is not available under federal law, the Court reasoned
119 Id. at 273.
120 See id. The

defendant relied on the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, which had a
limitations period of two years, as an affirmative defense. Id. at 263. The New
Mexico Tort Claims Act reads in pertinent part: "Actions against a governmental
entity or a public employee for torts shall be forever barred, unless such action is
commenced within two years after the date of occurrence resulting in loss, injury or
death." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (1978).
121 Wilson, 471 at 274. The Court noted that two other statutes in addition to
New Mexico's Tort Claims Act, that may have been applicable: N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 37-1-8 (1978) (providing a three-year period for "injury to the person or reputation of any person") and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (1978) (providing a four-year
period for "all other actions not herein otherwise provided for").
122 See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 268. Wilson addressed the question of which statute of limitations applies to an alleged violation of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Id. The Act, in
its present form reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage.., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
125 Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268.
126 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
127 Id. at 267.
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that the Act directs the trial court to look to an appropriate state
cause of action. 2 8 Accordingly, the Wilson Court recognized that
a retreat to state law to characterize the section 1983 claim was
unnecessary because federal law was available to the defendant
1 29
under section 1988 of the Act.
Second, the Court posited that a determination must be
made as to whether claims arising under the same federal statute
should be "evaluated differently depending upon the varying factual circumstances and legal theories presented in each individual case."'' 30 The Wilson Court maintained that congressional
intent implies that all actions brought under the Act should be
uniformly treated. '31
Third, the Court declared that it must be determined
whether federal or state limitations periods govern the individual
claim. 1 32 The Court announced that in the interest of uniformity
and certainty, the application of one state statute of limitations
for all section 1983 claims would best satisfy congressional
33
intent. 1
The Wilson Court, while affirming the court of appeals' use of
a state statute of limitations, '3'established the process of characterizing the claim before deciding which limitations period would
best serve congressional intent. 1 35 In doing so the Court demon128 Id. The Court maintained that while the Reconstruction Civil Rights Act directs the application of federal laws initially,
in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in
the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be
extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the
cause.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
129 Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268-69.
130 Id. at 268.
131 See id. at 268-69. The Court stressed that "Congress surely did not intend to
assign to state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of
defining and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action." Id.
at 269.
132 Id. at 268.
133 Id. at 270. The most appropriate limitations period was found to be the
three-year provision contained in New Mexico's personal injury statute. Id. at 280.
(citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978)).
134 Id. at 280. The Wilson Court, after applying the three-step analysis, decided
the New Mexico three-year limitations period for personal injury actions was best
suited for this cause of action. Id.
135 Id. at 268.
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strated its willingness to abandon the use of the "absorption doctrine. '"36 Instead of looking to the most analogous state cause of
action for the particular federal claim, the Court chose one uni37
form period for all causes of action arising out of section 1983.'
Justice O'Connor penned a dissent staunchly opposing the
majority decision. 138 "[W]ith hardly a backward look," Justice
O'Connor charged, "the majority leaves behind a century of precedent."'' 39 Justice O'Connor contended that in its desire to implement a more simplistic and uniform system, the Court had
legislated in an area properly left to Congress. 40 Justice
O'Connor emphasized that in the Court's zeal to create a more
uniform approach to the determination of limitations periods, it
had actually created a dichotomy between actions arising under
14 1
both federal and state laws.
In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in DelCostello and
Wilson, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. v. Crown Life Insurance Co., 142 was able to reexamine the

strict use of the "absorption doctrine."' 143 In Malley-Duff, the
court held "that within each state all civil RICO claims should be
characterized uniformly" and found the most appropriate limitations period in Pennsylvania's six-year residual statute of
limitations. "44
136

Id. at 280 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

137

Id.

See id.
Id. at 283 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318
(1914); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 270 (1830)).
140 See id. at 284 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that Congress had recently failed to enact proposed legislation to set a specific statute of
limitations on actions arising from § 1983. Id. According to Justice O'Connor, the
Court's decision effectively usurps congressional intent to "subject such action to
the general laws of the State applicable to actions of a similar nature." Id. at 281
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616
138

139

(1895)).
141 See id. at 284-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For example, Justice O'Conner
observed that in Pennsylvania, a claim alleging the violation of constitutional rights
in a breach of contract action will be extinguished in two years if brought under
§ 1983, while its state law counterpart remains actionable for up to six years. Id. at
286 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
142 792 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Agency Holding Corp. v. MalleyDuff& Assocs., Inc., 107 S.Ct. 2759 (1987).
143 Malley-Duff, 792 F.2d at 345.
144 Id. at 345. Malley-Duff, an agent of Crown Life Insurance Company, filed a
complaint against Crown Life alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). Id. at 343.
Malley-Duff claimed Crown Life had fraudulently conspired to terminate the
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The Malley-Duff court, in applying the Wilson three-step analfirst stated that since civil RICO offered an adequate remedy for the defendant's claim, resort to state law for
characterization of the claim was not necessary. 4 6 Pursuant to
the second step, the court concluded that a single policy of repose should be applied to all civil RICO claims brought in a
given state.14 7 The court reasoned that in civil RICO cases the
specific elements of the cause of action are too unique to support
the implementation of varying state provisions. 148 Employing the
third prong of the Wilson test, the Malley-Duff court advanced that
49
Pennsylvania's six-year residual "catch-all" limitations period'
was most analogous to the federal law and should be applied to
all civil RICO actions brought within the state.' 5°
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals'
application of the Wilson test to civil RICO actions.' 5 1 Modifying
the lower court's holding, however, the Supreme Court declared
that a federal limitations period, not Pennsylvania's six-year state
1 52
provision, was most analogous to claims brought under RICO.
The Court reasoned that the four-year limitations period incorporated in the federal Clayton Act clearly provides a "far closer
analogy" to the RICO laws.' 53 The Malley-Duff Court further explained that the "similarities in purpose and structure between
ysis, 14 5

agency by imposing "bogus" production quotas that Malley-Duff failed to meet. Id.
The district court dismissed the complaint because the claims fell outside Pennsylvania's two-year limitation period governing fraud actions. Id. at 344-45 & n.7.
145 Id. at 345-46. While noting no prior precedent for the use of the Wilson approach to RICO claims, the Mailey-Duff court declared that "[t]here is nothing in
the opinion . . .that would suggest that the approach is unique to § 1983 cases."
Id. at 345 n.9.
146 Id. at 346.
147 Id. at 347.
148 See id. at 348.
149 Id. at 352. The court observed that most states have such a "catch-all" statute
for actions not subject to any other limitations period. Id.
150 Id. at 352-53.
151 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S.Ct. 2759
(1987).
152 Id. at 2764.
153 Id. The Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States .. .and shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
The Court noted that Congress had patterned civil RICO after many of the instrumentalities incorporated within the Clayton Act. See Malley-Duff, 107 S. Ct. at 2764.
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RICO and the Clayton Act . . . strongly counsel[ed] in favor5 4of
application" of the Clayton Act's express limitations period.
Unlike other federal claims, the Court emphasized that the
predicate acts necessary to establish a RICO claim cannot be
characterized within any single analogous state law.' 5 5 Thus, the
Malley-Duff Court determined that "It]he multistate nature of
RICO indicates the desirability of a uniform federal statute of
56
limitations."
In In re DataAccess Systems Securities Litigation,157 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with the occasion to apply
the Supreme Court's recently developed principles to federal securities actions. 158 Noting that the analysis used in both Roberts
and Biggans had been rejected by the Supreme Court in its review
of Malley-Duff,151 the Data Access court concluded that it was no
longer restrained from borrowing limitations periods from analogous federal law in actions involving alleged violations under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.' 6 ° Accordingly, the court posited that
a single, well-defined limitations period, borrowed from analogous federal securities laws, may now be used for all claims arising from the implied private cause of action under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.' 6 1
Judge Aldisert, writing for the majority, framed the two issues before the court as whether the Supreme Court's decisions
in DelCostello, Wilson, and Malley-Duff require the court of appeals
to reexamine Roberts and Biggans; and if so, what is the proper
limitations period applicable to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 acId. at 2765.
Id. Emphasizing the sui generis temperament of RICO, the Court posited that
it is not conducive to any single state limitations period. Id. While use of Pennsylvania's "catch-all" personal injury provision may be analogous, the Court noted
that not all states have such statutes. Id. The Court declared that "[t]he federal
policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation strongly suggest that the limitations period of the Clayton Act is .. .significantly more appropriate." Id.
156 Id. at 2766. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, characterized the
Court's decision as a "giant leap into the realm of legislative judgments." Id. at
2767 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 1543. Both Roberts and Biggans were decided on their unique sets of
facts. Id. at 1541. Because the states' blue sky laws did not give rise to causes of
actions under the specific fact patterns, the court was forced to use the limitations
period for common law fraud. Id. This "claim-by-claim" analysis was rejected in
Malley-Duff, where the Supreme Court found a uniform limitations period desirable
in RICO suits. Id. at 1550.
160 Id.
154

155

16 1 See id.

1989]

NOTE

743

tions. 1 6 2 Because the court was sitting in banc, Judge Aldisert
reasoned that it was free to make determinations without the re163
straint of panel precedents.
Although the district court certified two very specific questions for review, 1 64 the majority noted it could consider all
grounds requiring reversal.' 6 5 The majority stated that the first
question certified, whether plaintiffs' claims must state a viable
cause of action under New Jersey's Blue Sky law in order for the
law's limitations period to be applicable, presented it with the
opportunity to consider the effect of the court's decisions in Roberts and Biggans. 16 6 In regard to the second certified question,
whether defendants can be classified as "sellers" under the Blue
Sky law, the court noted its answer would depend upon its deci16 7
sion as to the first.
Judge Aldisert emphasized that the Supreme Court has yet
to decide on the proper statute of limitations applicable to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions.' 6 8 The majority observed that
federal courts, 16 9 including those in the Third Circuit, 7 ° and
many commentators' 71 have lamented over the difficulty that exists in trying to apply the most analogous state limitations period
17 2
to federal remedial provisions.
As an example, Judge Aldisert noted that in Roberts, the majority chose to apply the New Jersey common law fraud six-year
statute of limitations to an action brought under section 10(b)
Id. at 1537-38.
Id. at 1538.
164 Id. at 1539. The district court actually certified three questions for review. Id.
Because the language of the second question embraced the parties and the issues in
the third question, however, the court proceeded as if only two had been certified.
Id.
165 Id. (citing Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 962 n.7 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984)).
166 Id. at 1539.
167 Id. The Data Access court, in holding an analogous federal limitations period
should be used, never needed to decide this question. See id. at 1550.
168 Id. at 1539 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29
(1976)).
169 Id. at 1539-40 (citing Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 1329 (1987)).
170 Id. (citing Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stewart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605 (3d
Cir. 1980); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979)).
162
163

171 Id. (citing T. HAZEN, THE LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 13.8 & n.2
(1985); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1164-75 (1983); Report

of the Task Force on Statute of Limitationsfor Implied Actions, 4 Bus. LAw. 645 (1986)).
172

Id. at 1539-40.
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and Rule lOb-5.' 7 3 Judge Aldisert asserted that the decision in
Roberts was predicated on the notion that a federal court must
apply analogous state limitations periods to such actions. 174 He
found it significant, however, that both Judge Gibbons writing
for the majority, and Chief Judge Seitz writing in dissent,
stressed the desirability of using analogous federal limitations
periods but were constrained by Supreme Court precedents of
borrowing state periods.' 7 5 Judge Aldisert perceived such constraint as no longer binding in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent holdings in Malley-Duff and DelCostello, where the Court
76
directed application of analogous federal periods of repose.'
In his opinion, Judge Aldisert also discussed Biggans v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, 1 77 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' most
recent decision regarding limitations periods in federal securities
law cases. 178 In Biggans, the court followed the Roberts analysis in
determining that when a state blue sky law does not afford the
plaintiff a cause of action but the state common law does, the
latter period must be applied.' 7 9 The Data Access court emphasized that in Roberts and Biggans different state limitations periods
could have applied to the section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions
depending upon the allegations contained in the complaint and
whether the plaintiff was a buyer or seller.""
Therefore, the Data Access court declared that "under this
court's construction, no uniform statute of limitations for all Section 10(b) cases exists even within the same state."''
Because of
the distinctive fact patterns of Roberts and Biggans, Judge Aldisert
maintained that under the "absorption doctrine," district courts
are left without definitive guidelines to follow when deciding
173 Id. at 1540 (citing Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (1979)).
174

Id.

175

Id.

176

See id.

177 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980).

For a more detailed discussion of Biggans, see
supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
178 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1541.
179 Id.
180 See id. The court noted that in Biggans, the plaintiff alleged churning of accounts and was thus entitled to the six-year common law fraud statute of limitations
because Pennsylvania securities law did not establish such a cause of action. Id.
Had the plaintiff's claim been based on fraud in the sale or purchase of securities,
however, the one-year limitations period under the state blue sky law would have
applied. Id.
181 Id. (quoting Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605, 612
(3d Cir. 1980) (Weis, J., dissenting)).
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cases arising under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.' 8 2 According
Court's holding in Malto Judge Aldisert, however, the Supreme
83
ley-Duff established such guidelines.
The Third Circuit reasoned that Malley-Duff provided a
formula to be used in determining the proper limitations period. 8 4 The court pointed out that the formula first requires
characterizing the federal claim, and then deciding whether a
federal or state limitations period should be utilized. 8 5 Judge
Aldisert observed that while Supreme Court precedent has called
for applying an analogous state limitations period under the
Rules of Decision Act,' 8 6 the DelCostello Court determined that a
federal limitations period may offer a more closely analogous alternative."' The Data Access court thus acknowledged the DelCostello decision as one allowing a federal court to decide whether a
state or federal period best represents congressional intent. 8
Judge Aldisert recalled that when borrowing state law, the
Third Circuit has recognized the need for introducing a uniform
limitations period. 8 9 The court emphasized that while the
claims in Roberts and Biggans were brought under section 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5, different limitations periods were applied due to
their particular factual circumstances. 90 This claim-based approach, reasoned the Data Access court, does not promote "[t]he
federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of
unnecessary litigation."' 19 ' To be consistent with the Supreme
Court's rulings in Del Costello, Wilson, and Malley-Duff, the Data Acapproach employed in Roberts and Biggans
cess court held that 9the
2
must be modified.'
See id.
Id. at 1542.
Id. The formula used by the Supreme Court in Malley-Duff was first introduced by the Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). See supra notes 11641 and accompanying text.
185 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1542. More specifically, the court "determined
whether all claims arising out of the federal statute should be characterized in the
same way, or whether they should be evaluated differently depending upon the
varying factual circumstances and legal theories presented in each individual case."
Id. (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759,
2762 (1987)).
186 Id. See e.g.,
Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
327 U.S. 392 (1946); McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
187 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1542.
182
183
184

188 See id.
189 Id. at 1543.
190 See id. at 1542-43.

19' Id. at 1543 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985)).
l,92

Id.
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The majority considered the approach used in Malley-Duff to
be particularly adaptable to claims based on section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.19 3 In Malley-Duff, RICO claims were required to be
brought within a uniform limitations period. 194 The court noted
that federal RICO claims are similar to section 10(b) and Rule
1Ob-5 claims in that differing factual situations lead to the possible application of a variety of analogous state statutes of
limitations. 9-'
Because both RICO and securities claims can run the gambit
of legal theories, 1 96 Judge Aldisert acknowledged the need to
promote uniformity and certainty within the federal judicial system. 19 7 Thus, the Data Access court concluded that, as in RICO,
the selection of "the one most appropriate statute of limitations
for all civil [claims]" arising under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
would best suit the true congressional intent of the law.' 9 8 In
determining the single appropriate limitations period, the court
called attention to the difference between private actions brought
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and common law fraud
suits. 199

The majority observed that the Supreme Court has recently
emphasized that "modern securities markets, literally involving
millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-toface transactions contemplated by early fraud cases.' ' 2 00 The major problem with applying common law fraud limitations periods
to securities actions, noted Judge Aldisert, is that early doctrines
developed from transactions involving tangible items. ° ' Such
laws, the court continued, are ill-suited for application to securities litigation.20 2 Therefore, while section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5
193

Id.

Id. (citing Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341 (3d
Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nor. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107
S. Ct. 2759 (1987)). For a more complete discussion of Malley-Duff, see supra notes
142-56 and accompanying text.
195 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1543.
196 Id. The court aptly noted that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims, like civil RICO,
"embrace a galaxy of actions." Id.
197 See id. at 1543-44.
198 See id. at 1544 (quoting Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792
F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987) (emphasis in original)).
199 Id. The court declared that "we must not make the error of equating private
rights of actions under [§ I 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 with available common law fraud
actions." Id.
200 Id. (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 989-90 (1988)).
201 Id.
202 Id.
194
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may be historically linked to common law misrepresentations
claims, the majority concluded that the newer securities regulations are sui generis.2 °3
Thus, Judge Aldisert found that the Supreme Court's disdain with the application of contrasting state fraud limitations periods sent "strong signals that we should adopt a uniform
limitations period in these cases. 2 °4 The remaining issue, acknowledged the majority, was whether such a period should be
borrowed from state or federal law.20 5
Congressional intent usually mandates the borrowing of a
state period, explained the Data Access court, unless a federal provision "clearly provides a closer analogy. 20 6 Judge Aldisert asserted that the limitations period found within the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provides such an alternative. 20 7 Noting
that Congress established a uniform limitations period for all but
one section of the Act,20 8 the majority observed that period to be
"within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the
violation and within three years after such violation. "209 The
court maintained that Congress specifically enacted this absolute
three-year period because longer periods would disrupt normal
business activities. 210 Citing Chief Judge Seitz's dissent in Roberts, the Data Access court recognized two strong federal interests
in limiting claims to three years. 2 " One such interest recognized
by the court is that immediate action alerts all parties to possible
misconduct by the corporation. 21 2 Additionally, the court posited that business deals can be treated as closed after three years,
thereby eliminating any uncertainty that may linger from past
transactions. 213
203
204
205

Id. at 1545.
Id.

206

Id.

Id.

Id.
Id. The only section that did not contain the same limitations period was
§ 16(b). Id. at 1546. Section 16(b), governing profit regulations, establishes a
shorter outside limitations period of two years from the time the action accrues. Id.
The court distinguished this shorter period and concluded that "[b]ecause the brief
time period implicated in section 16(b) cases does not necessarily inhere in section
10(b) actions, we believe that the general one-year-after-discovery and three-yearsafter-the-violation scheme is better suited for our consideration." Id.
209 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1982)).
210 Id.
211 Id. (citing Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 611 (3d Cir. 1979)
(Seitz, C.J., dissenting)).
207
208

212

Id.

213

Id.
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Judge Aldisert further explained that because a private cause
-ofaction was judicially implied for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
the court must determine what remedy would most likely have
been established by Congress.2 14 In determining the appropriate
limitations period, Judge Aldisert stated that the court must look
to the "entire body of federal securities law of which section

10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are a part. "215

The court observed that the relevant law to be examined was
embraced within the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.216 The majority noted that the 1933 Act established a private cause of action by a buyer of securities against
the seller for supplying false or misleading prospectuses. 2 , 7 The
1934 Act made unlawful the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security. '"218 In reviewing the main purposes of these two
acts, Judge Aldisert asserted that the goals of section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 claims would best be served by borrowing the federal
statute. 2 9 Applying the Malley-Duff test of "far closer analogy,"
the majority found that these sections resemble companion portions of federal securities law far more than any state provisions. 2 2 0 The DataAccess court thus concluded that section 10(b),
Rule lOb-5 and their companion provisions all reflect the intentions expounded in the securities acts of 1933 and 1934.2
Judge Aldisert declared that the one-year/three-year scheme
extracted from similar provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 best reflects the federal nature of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 claims.2 2 Therefore, the DataAccess court determined that
all private causes of action arising from section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 will be subject to this single, well-defined limitations pe214 Id. at 1547. The Data Access court distinguished this process from a situation

where Congress had created a cause of action but intentionally left remedial fashioning to the judiciary. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that the implied private

cause of action was judicially created in a district court and was confirmed 25 years
later by the Supreme Court. Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 1548.
218 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)).
219 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)).
220 Id.
221 Id. Judge Aldisert noted these intentions "provid[ed] full and fair disclosure
of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through
the mails, and . . . prevent[ed] frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes."
Id. (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975)).
222 Id.

at 1548-49.
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riod. 2 23 In conclusion, the Data Access court stated that it would
not address the question of whether this new rule of law will have
a prospective effect because "the district court did not request
that we address the issue of whether our rulings should have prospective effect only and not apply to the present case. "224
Judge Seitz filed a dissenting opinion in which Judges
Sloviter and Mansmann joined. 22 5 According to Judge Seitz, the
majority, in establishing the new limitations period, failed to answer the questions certified by the district court.2 2 6 The dissent
contended that while the district court properly submitted the order to be reviewed, the majority disregarded this order and instead ruled on the entire decision of the lower court.2 2 7 Because
the majority overturned the district court's decision, asserted
Judge Seitz, it is necessary to determine whether the new rule of
law should be adopted prospectively only.2 2 8 Judge Seitz insisted
that "it is commonplace for courts formulating a new or different
2 29
rule of law to rule on its retroactivity at the same time."
Therefore, Judge Seitz stressed that the three-part test established by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson 230 must be used to determine whether the new limitations
period should apply to the case at bar.2 3 '
The first part of the test requires the court to ascertain if
their decision clearly "establish[es] a new principle of law ... by
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied."' 23 2 Judge Seitz recognized that the majority's overruling of
Biggans and Roberts, as well as the adoption of a federal limitations
period, clearly overturned precedent upon which the plaintiffs
Id. at 1550.
Id. The Data Access court reversed the district court's application of the sixyear statute of limitations borrowed from the state common law fraud provision
and remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 1551.
225 Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting)
226 Id.
227 Id. Judge Seitz noted that under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) an appellate court is
confined to ruling on the order of the lower court and may not rule on individual
legal questions. Id. (citing Miller v. Bolger, 802 F.2d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 1986). The
court of appeals in the case at bar was required to rule on the question of whether
the plaintiffs stated a cause actionable under the New Jersey Blue Sky law. Id. at
1539.
228 Id. at 1552 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
229 Id.
230 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
231 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1552 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
232 Id. (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (citations
omitted)).
223
224
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may have been granted relief.2 3 3
The second part of the Chevron test calls for an inquiry into
whether retroactive use of the rule would "retard the policies underlying its general applicability. ' 23 4 The dissent noted that retroactive application of the rule in the present case would
foreclose any remedy to the plaintiffs because their complaint
would have been brought outside the new limitations period.2 3 5
Finally, the Chevron test employs an equitable principle
which requires the court to weigh the injustice that a retroactive
application of the new rule may impose. 23 6 Retroactive application of the federal limitations period, maintained Judge Seitz,
237
would unjustly foreclose the plaintiffs' opportunity for relief.
After concluding that the rule announced should not be
given retroactive effect, Judge Seitz addressed the questions originally certified by the district court. 238 Judge Seitz noted that
since the "plaintiffs' complaint did not state a claim under the
blue sky law," the district court's decision to apply the six-year
limitations period governing fraud should be affirmed.2 3 9
While the Data Access decision has answered the vexed question of which limitations period federal courts within the Third
Circuit must apply to actions under section 10(b) and Rule lOb5, the underlying issue of national uniformity within such litigation has yet to be addressed. Following Data Access, federal
courts, outside the Third Circuit, have continued to employ the
erratic state-law based approach in determining statutes of limitations. 2 10 The confusion and inconsistency within this area will
Id. at 1553 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. A prospective application would allow the court to establish that the New
Jersey six-year statute of limitations governing fraud was controlling, thus enabling
the plaintiffs' suit to proceed. Id. at 1554 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
236 Id. at 1552 (Seitz,J., dissenting) (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97, 106-07 (1971)).
237 Id. at 1553 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
238 Id. at 1553-54 (Seitz, J., dissenting). See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
239 In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1554 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
240 See Durham v. Business Management Assoc., 847 F.2d 1505 (1 1th Cir. 1988)
(applying analogous state limitations provision to a section 10(b) action); Robin v.
Doctors Officenters Corp., 686 F. Supp. 199 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (applied state law,
however, noted growing support for a uniform federal period). An Eighth Circuit
district court noted the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' refusal to apply the Data
Access holding. TCF Banking & Sav. v. Arthur Young & Co., 697 F. Supp. 362, 366
(D. Minn. 1988). The district court considered itself restrained, by Eighth Circuit
precedent, from abandoning the absorption doctrine in favor of a federal limitations period. Id. at 367.
233
234
235

1989]

NOTE

751

continue until either the Supreme Court or Congress intervenes
by creating a specific limitations period applicable to all private
causes of action brought under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
It is axiomatic that the federal circuit courts, absent specific
direction from the Supreme Court, will not be able to join together in instituting a uniform standard. Most circuits are firmly
dedicated to their own approach in dealing with this type of litigation.2 4 ' The Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have steadfastly employed the use of periods derived from state blue sky
laws while the Second, Ninth and Tenth Circuits 242 have consistently applied the limitations period borrowed from general fraud
provisions of the forum state.2 4 Moreover, the greatest difficulty
in unifying the circuits behind a single period derives from the
differing rationales between the circuits regarding the length of
such a period.
The circuits utilizing state blue sky statutes tend to find a
shorter limitations period preferable.2 4 4 This approach conforms
to the shorter, three-year period found in the express limitations
provisions of the federal Securities Act of 1934 adopted by the
Data Access court. As the court recognized, there are two strong
federal interests in limiting claims to a shorter period.2 45 First,
immediate action alerts all parties to possible misconduct by the
corporation. Second, the shorter period allows business deals to
be finalized more rapidly, thereby facilitating the smoother running of corporate activities.
Alternatively, the circuits that rely on the limitations periods
found in state general fraud statutes often do so because such
periods tend to extend longer than those found in state securities
statutes.2 4 6 Such jurisdictions reason that a longer limitations
period provides a more equitable procedural safeguard to plaintiffs, especially when the claim involves allegations of conceal241 Block & Barton, Securities Litigation, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 374, 375-78 (1980).
242 While the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming followed
the Data Access holding in Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 695 F. Supp.
1156 (D. Wyo. 1988), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet decided the
issue.
243 See supra note 8 (discussing circuit courts' approaches to limitations periods).
244 BLOCK & BARTON, supra at 377-78.
245 In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537, 1546 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
246 Compare N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 213 (McKinney 1989) (applying a six-year
limitations period to general fraud actions) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-71(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1988) (applying a two-year limitations period to securities actions).
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ment.2 4 7 In such cases it is often difficult to discover the facts
necessary to bring an action until long after the defendants commit the alleged illegal acts. Therefore, many courts, in applying
these longer periods, stress that a shorter limitations period
would unfairly foreclose plaintiffs' actions.2 4 8
The Supreme Court has sent mixed signals to the federal circuits regarding its preference as to which limitations period
should apply to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions. While
never having formally ruled on the appropriate period of repose,
prior to the Data Access case it appeared that the Court acquiesced
to the approach of borrowing analogous state provisions. 249 Failure to review the Data Access decision, however, seemingly indicates a change in the Court's posture. The Court may now be
receptive to the use of the three-year period enunciated by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals. However, many federal courts
are reluctant to abandon precedent and follow the Third Circuit
without the Court's expressed consent.
Without the guidance of the Supreme Court the confusion in
litigating section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions will continue unless Congress intercedes with appropriate legislation. An expressed federal statute of limitations applicable to all civil actions
brought under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 would eliminate the
need for courts to fashion individual remedies. Indeed congressional legislation may be the most suitable remedy because it is
the function of the legislature, not the judiciary, to decree statutory regulations.
The American Law Institute (ALI) has proposed a detailed
statute of limitations in its Federal Securities Code draft.2 50 The
ALI Code would provide a limitations period of one year after
the discovery of the facts necessary to support a claim and no
longer than five years after the alleged illegal activity transpired.2 5 ' By adopting the ALI standard or extending the one247 See BLOCK & BARTON, supra note 241, at 377 n.21.
248 See United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
U.S. 1004 (1973) (stating longer limitations periods best fit the broad remedial
icies of federal securities law); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 8 (5th
1967); Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 799, 803 (M.D.

414
polCir.
Fla.

1972).
249 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1975) ("Since no
statute of limitations is provided for civil actions under § 10(b), the law of limitations of the forum state is followed as in other cases of judicially implied
remedies.")
250 FED. SEC. CODE § 1727(b) (1980).
251 Id.
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and-three-year expressed limitations periods contained in existing federal securities statutes to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
actions, Congress could conclusively alleviate confusion in this
area.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized
the need for federal uniformity in securities litigation. The Data
Access decision was an important step toward devising a consistent
approach in section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions. The Supreme
Court or Congress must now act to assure that litigants in this
federal arena are afforded equal remedies.
RobertJohn Beacham

